![]() ![]() Where the entire history is stored indefinitely. This problem is particularly pronounced when the Pass directory is stored in e.g. Leaks Changesįurthermore the adversary can learn when (and which) entries are created / deleted / modified. Read the directory structure of the password vault. To learn which services you have accounts on. Since the file names are not encrypted in Pass a passive adversary can read the directory structure Starting roughly with the most obvious ones: No Service Privacy ![]() So let us look at some of these “anti-features” of Pass, (a pass front-end) supports loading passwords over WebDAVĪnd that gopass is touting itself as “git by default”.Ĭlearly some users expect to store their encrypted passwords on servers on the internet Dropbox, you rely on active security.įurther justification for considering active security is the fact that qtpass These parties may modify the contents bestowed to them at will without allowing the user to detect the modification (the exception being e.g. Most users back up their password vault with some third party, e.g. ![]() I believe that considering active adversaries is reasonable and that most users implicitly assume some protection against active adversaries: How much interaction is required with the victim?.To which extend does the password manager enable the adversary to modify entries?.Here there is also a variety of different properties one can strive to achieve: Active Security / Active AdversaryĪctive Security (informally): The adversary cannot violate “privacy” or modify entries,Įven when allowed to tamper with the encrypted password vault contents.Ī desirable property is that the adversary cannot manipulate or reveal your passwords,Įven if he is allowed to modify the encrypted contents. Vs, adversaries who can observe the entire history of the encrypted contents. Snapshot adversaries which only receive a single instance of the encrypted contents, Passive adversaries can be further subdivided by considering e.g. Otherwise we might as well not encrypt at all. Against adversaries with what types of compute?Ĭlearly we expect that people might be able to read the encrypted state of your password manager:.Does it hide the length / number of passwords?.Does the password manager hide the services or just the passwords?.Here the informal weasel-word “privacy” covers a wide variety of security notions, e.g. Passive Security (informally): “privacy” is ensured when the adversary can only read the encrypted contents. There are broadly two classes of adversaries that seem to apply: Passive Security / Passive Adversary ![]() To accomplish in the presence of an adversary (with varying degrees of power). Not abundantly clear to me what security users expect from their password managers… What do we expect?īefore we look at Pass, let us start by getting a rough idea about what we expect a password manager I call them “anti-features” because they cannot really be classified as vulnerabilities.Ī vulnerability necessitates a (semi-formal) notion of security (which is violated) and it is In this post I would like to argue that “Pass” has a number of of anti-features. This is not surprising: Pass requires that its user has some grasp of PGP,Īs a result relatively few people use Pass, however those that do are necessarily “tech-savvy”.īut does the use of public key encryption (PGP) in the way that it isĪpplied in “Pass” give rise to a “good” password manager? Hacker News, /r/crypto, /r/netsec, “Netsec/Crypto twitter”). Particularly on the more “tech-savvy” parts of the internet (e.g. The Pass password manager is often recommended, These encrypted files may be organized into meaningful folder hierarchies, copied from computer to computer, and, in general, manipulated using standard command line file management utilities. With pass, each password lives inside of a gpg encrypted file whose filename is the title of the website or resource that requires the password. Password management should be simple and follow Unix philosophy. What is “Pass the standard unix password manager”? (In)Security of the "Pass" password manager ROT256 : Cryptography & Other Random Bits. ![]()
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